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Introduction 
As an anthropologist who studies the religious beliefs and practices of others, I have long 
pondered the role that my own religious experience plays in my work, and I am similarly 
curious concerning the relationship between personal belief and practice and the 
anthropological study of religion in the work of my contemporaries. What follows is a 
reflection of these interests. I attempt to survey some current anthropological approaches 
to religion in the context of current intellectual trends, particularly in the fields of the 
philosophy of language, postmodernism and science, while at the same time advancing an 
argument for the distinctiveness of ethnographic fieldwork as a methodological tool that can 
give a unique and immensely valuable insight in to the nature of religion as a social fact. This 
rests on the premise that the embodied encounter between the anthropologist and the 
‘other’, who becomes an object of study, combines internal experience and reflexivity in a 
way that has the potential for successful and honest cultural translation, through recognition 
of the essentially dialogical and contextual nature of knowledge.  
 
 
The Politics of Religion 
The Christian traditions of the University of Wales Lampeter are reflected in the recitation of 
the Lord’s Prayer, usually led by a bishop, at the beginning of Council meetings. Although 
some members of Council find this explicitly Christian (Anglican) religious performance 
anachronistic in a modern secular university, overt dissension is rarely expressed. Prayers in 
public at an academic gathering proved more contentious at the annual meeting of the 
Association of Social Anthropologists in London, on the theme of indigenous knowledge, 
held in April 2000. This event provided a rare example of anthropologists reflecting on their 
own religious practices in front of one another. Religion as a theme at anthropological 
conferences is common – religion after all informs social and cultural life in all human 
societies and is therefore an important component of anthropological investigation and 
analysis. Even among anthropologists specialising in religion, however, there is no 
assumption that those concerned are themselves participants in a religious tradition, or lay 
claim to a personal spirituality. An email exchange prior to the conference concerning a 
potential ‘religious’ performance demonstrated clearly the political and religious differences 
that exist within a broader anthropological culture.
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 A Canadian participant, Peter Croal, 
asked the conference organisers whether they had ‘thought of an opening and closing 
prayer from an indigenous person who may be at the conference?’ He went on to state that 
‘This is quite customary here in North America at all meetings where traditional knowledge 
or indigenous peoples are participating. It is a sign of respect, and provides all participants 
with a moment to reflect and give thanks before the meetings begin’. The writer invited 
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comments from conference colleagues, which initiated an interesting series of reflections on 
the religious standpoints of various anthropologists participating in the conference, and 
above all highlighted the politics of religious discourse. The first response was from my 
colleague, Veronica Strang, who responded with the statement that she ‘would be delighted 
to see indigenous participants comment upon this (and any other aspect of the conference)’, 
but that she was ‘very dubious indeed about the prospect of this taking the form of a 
prayer.’ Strang, who works on Australian Aboriginal cosmologies and attitudes to the 
environment, went on to ask ‘A prayer to whom? To whose God(s)? According to whose 
beliefs? To whom would we be “giving thanks”?’, continuing, ‘Personally I would not care to 
feel roped into some kind of religiosity to which I do not subscribe, and feel this would be 
out of place at the ASA conference, however ‘customary’ it may have become in America’. 
She expressed the wish that colleagues would reject the suggestion, however well 
intentioned. A sub-text in Strang’s response was that inviting indigenous participants to 
comment on the actual organisation of the conference would show far more respect than 
the artificial imposition of a form of ‘religiosity’ that would alienate at least some of the 
participants. Croal responded by saying that: 
This is not about forcing people to ascribe to any particular religious belief at all. I have been at 
ceremonies where sweetgrass or the pipe was passed around. If one decides not to participate, 
it is not viewed as a negative gesture. And, I thought the noun ‘prayer’ may have brought some 
religious elements into my suggestion which is not my intent. The ‘prayer’ in practical or lay 
terms is about giving thanks and asking all the participants good health, common purpose and 
safe journeys. Maybe others on this list [the email list of participants] can add their 
understanding. 
One contributor to this discussion from Florida supported Peter Croal’s idea, having had 
experience of a prayer conducted at the opening of a conference on indigenous knowledge 
in 1994, prompting Strang to reiterate her question, ‘giving thanks to whom?’ suggesting 
that if any implied religious content were removed the proposal might be better received. To 
this Croal came up with a list of possible recipients for any thanks offered in this context, an 
interesting mixture of ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’, with the implication that participants could 
interpret such a prayer as they wished, a recitation taking the form of a litany: 
Thanks to the creator … whoever and however one perceives that to be 
Thanks for clear minds, vision and strength to ensure the meeting is a  success 
Thanks to our family and employers for allowing us to be at the  gathering 
Thanks for the opportunity to share knowledge 
Thanks for so many people to gather in one place to discuss an  important topic 
Thanks to Earth for providing life to sustain us. 
At this point other participants from North America entered the field, very revealingly for an 
understanding of the tensions that the practice of religion in a conference setting of 
anthropologists exposed. Weighing in on Strang’s side was Constance McCorkle, who 
cheered:  
Here-here: I was at a[n] ‘indigenous stuff’ conference … in Ottawa – where to open the thing, 
Native American Indians did some prayers and chants and – horror of horrors in today’s North 
America – were allowed to smoke tobacco (in a peace pipe) in a no-smoking government 
building! I would very much have enjoyed having that same privilege myself, being a real sinner 
from way back. But it was accorded only to the ‘performers’ – who were also conferees. … To 
me, this is not respect, but theatre! It also very much set the stage for a right-off-the-bat 
distancing among the … high-level medical scientists, versus the local folks and the touchy-
feely social scientists. Scientists didn’t get to stand up and publicly perform one of their lab 
rituals, for instance. You could almost have cut the tension with a knife, and the whole 
conference got off to a very wobbly start. Fortunately so far, this is NOT standard practice in 
conferences on local knowledge, etc. in the US. In any case, whoever’s ritual or prayer is 
represented means a lot of other peoples’ are not. So forget this idea. It’s a bad one. Maybe 
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the next trendy thing in Northern obeisance to the South will be less offensive. I’m glad to 
know at least one other anthropologist who recognizes that all behaviours have their proper 
cultural contexts. 
Even more pithily, a Portuguese anthropologist asked, 
Dear Colleagues 
Should I and my colleagues António Medeiros, Pedro Sena and Sofia Tomaz consider ourselves 
‘indigenous’ with a proper ‘system of indigenous knowledge’, coming as we do from Portugal? 
Are we expected to perform any obscure Catholic ceremony, and shall we bring our self-
flogging equipment? 
Best,  
Manuel João Ramos 
 
Although much of the debate was humorous in tone, it did touch on some sensitive issues 
for many anthropologists. One element is the unease at the power imbalance between the 
Western academics and the ‘indigenous’ people’s whose knowledge formed the basis for the 
conference. In North America one might expect to have Native American participants at a 
conference on such a theme, whereas in Europe one is more likely to find exclusively 
Western trained academics interpreting the cultural knowledge of Australian Aboriginals or 
African hunter-gatherers. Although, as Manuel João Ramos indicated, anyone can be 
considered ‘indigenous’ to their own country and culture, the term ‘indigenous’ comes with 
a colonial baggage and images of ‘them’ and ‘us’, however highly valued ‘they’ and their 
knowledge might be.
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 Assumptions and stereotypes concerning the secularity of many 
Western academics, versus the integrated and integral role of ‘religion’ in the cosmologies of 
‘indigenous’ peoples, is therefore part of an uneasy power differential. A third theme 
underlying these exchanges, together with the Western/Third World and Secular/Religious 
dichotomies, is that of science and rationality versus religion and irrationality, a topic to 
which I return in a later section of this paper. 
 
 
Anthropologists and Belief 
Anthropologists don’t often reveal what they really think or believe. It is considered 
desirable, indeed essential, to explain one’s methodological position, but anthropologists 
rarely reveal their own subjective standpoint in matters of religion. There is a realistic fear of 
being misunderstood by those who do not share a similar background or experiences, 
whether other academics or informants. This came over clearly in the responses to an email 
questionnaire I circulated to some twenty or so anthropologists who study religion. Some of 
these responses were as follows: 
 
(1) A young Polish anthropologist, Ewa Klekot, a baptised but non-practising Roman Catholic 
who works on Christian art and symbolism, stated that while it is desirable that 
ethnographies should be open about spiritual or religious relationships between a 
fieldworker and his or her subjects, ‘it is very hard to find the clear and convincing way of 
explaining your relationships with your subjects in the same way [as] the methodology is 
explained’. She admitted that she had never done so for fear of being misunderstood. She 
suspected that honest discussion with fieldwork subjects would only be possible with 
subjects who had the same level of self-consciousness (reflexivity concerning their own 
religious position) as the anthropologist. 
(2) Natalie Tobert (who has worked as a ethnographic museum curator and latterly, medical 
anthropologist) responded by referring to the academic audience of anthropological texts, 
rather than to fieldwork subjects. She is from a secular Jewish background, and has had a 
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long engagement with shamanic practices in various forms. When she submitted her 
Masters dissertation, Tobert ‘spoke a lot about reflexivity, but … did not mention whether or 
not I had any personal experience’. She added ‘I do not consider it is functionally useful to be 
open when presenting material to the academic establishment’. 
 
(3) Another anthropologist of religion, also from a secular Jewish background, Simon 
Coleman, wrote his doctoral thesis on a conservative evangelical Christian group in Sweden.
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While he did not feel the need to pass comment on the rightness or otherwise of their 
theology, Coleman was surprised by the hostility his work aroused in others, claiming that 
‘everybody (academics, including most anthropologists, politicians, other Christians, 
journalists etc.) disliked the group I was studying intensely. That meant I was sometimes 
regarded as a sympathiser of the group when I didn’t condemn it … What interested me 
most was that fellow anthropologists were dismissive of the group – it didn’t fit in with their 
ideas of culture’. Coleman found that he had to justify the proposition that Evangelical 
Christians had a culture, and they were as worthy of study as the African Dinka or Nuer. 
 
Anthropologists are supposed to be good at practising methodological atheism, agnosticism 
or empathy (whatever one’s preferred phenomenological term may be), and are usually 
interested in cultural representations rather than truth claims, but some cultures and belief 
systems are, it would seem from these responses, more acceptable to the anthropological 
community than others. 
 
 
Language and Culture 
It is generally accepted among practising anthropologists that however open one tries to be 
open to the experience of others, or however alienated from one’s own society and its 
values, we cannot escape our own cultural baggage. High quality ethnographic data 
gathering and informed anthropological analysis therefore depend upon a reflexive 
understanding of one’s own standpoint, experiences and biases, and of the ways in which 
these might influence our interpretation of other cultures. The fact that this reflexivity is not 
always achieved, and the recognition that it is part of a dialogical process between the 
individual ethnographer, fieldwork subjects and academic community, does not negate the 
goal of unbiased, honest research that does justice to those one studies.  
 
Primacy is often accorded to language in relation to culture. As with social organisation, it 
both precedes and is made present through the actions of individuals. We may choose what 
we say, but we do so in relation to pre-existing categories, expressed within a particular 
language. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1974:14) observed, 
Language leads us to the things themselves to the precise extent that it is signification before 
having a signification. If we concede language only its secondary function, it is because we 
presuppose the first as given, because we make language depend upon an awareness of truth 
when it is actually a vehicle of truth. In this way we are putting language before language. 
The influential feminist commentator on gender and language, Dale Spender (1990:103), 
argued: 
Language is not neutral. It is not merely a vehicle which carries ideas. It is itself a shaper of 
ideas, it is the programme for mental activity. In this context it is nothing short of ludicrous to 
conceive of human beings of capable of grasping things as they really are, of being impartial 
recorders of their world. For they themselves, or some of them, at least, have created or 
constructed that world and they have reflected themselves within it. Human beings cannot 
impartially describe the universe because in order to describe it they must first have a 
classification system, once they have a language, they can only see certain arbitrary things.  
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Just how difficult it is to be truly open to the beliefs of others and to enter into a way of 
seeing the world outside one’s own heuristic framework (in which language plays a key role) 
was illustrated at another anthropological conference.
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 The discussion had turned to 
questions of honesty and integrity in the fieldwork situation. An eminent member of the 
profession who has conducted extensive fieldwork in Papua New Guinea told the story of an 
a village elder under pressure to convert to Christianity, who had asked whether the 
anthropologist ‘believed in the ancestors’. The question had considerable weight as the old 
man was forced to choose whether what the ancestors had taught him and his people about 
the afterlife, and about so many other aspects of their culture, was true or not. As an 
ethnographer with a great respect for the old man’s culture and traditional belief system, 
the anthropologist would have dearly loved to reassure the old man that the ancestors were 
indeed real, and give him some comfort and resolve, enabling him to stand up to the 
missionaries who played on his fear of making a wrong choice for which he might suffer 
dearly (by going to hell when he died). Faced, however, with a direct question, the 
anthropologist felt obliged to answer ‘No! I do not believe in the ancestors’. 
 
The story ended there and we did not learn whether this anthropologist believed in Jesus, 
Christianity or any other religious system either. What struck me, apart from the poignancy 
of the account, was not the desire, common among anthropologists, to place a high value on 
the intrinsic worth of ‘traditional’ non-Western religions and the cultures of which they are a 
part, but the interpretation of the old man’s question. The term ‘believe’, ‘credo’ has overt 
Christian connotations, it is associated with heroic faith in the face of religious persecution. 
Terms such as ‘belief’ are culturally contingent and the concept conveyed may have no 
ready cross-cultural significance or translation. I am not a specialist in the languages or 
cultures of Papua New Guinea, but from my knowledge of African religions I strongly suspect 
that the traditional elder was not asking ‘Do the ancestors exist?’, ‘Do the ancestors have 
any ontological reality?’, which may have been the meaning conveyed to a native English-
speaker by the term ‘belief’, but rather ‘Are the ancestors effective?’ ‘Do the ancestors still 
have any power?’ In answer to such a question I would personally have had no difficulty 
answering ‘Yes, I believe they exist’, that is, they are still effective if one believes that a 
certain way of seeing the world has its own logic and reality - even if I could not honestly 
claim to accord them external ontological being. As Durkheim (who thought of himself as an 
atheist) put it, ‘we admit that … religious beliefs rest upon a scientific experience whose 
demonstrative value is, in one sense, not one bit inferior to that of scientific experiments, 
though different from them’ (1976:417). 
 
The Dutch ethnographer of the Cameroon grassfields, Robert Pool (1994), demonstrated just 
how slippery both Western medical and indigenous terms can be. What started out as an 
apparently straightforward attempt to discover why an area with sufficient food suffered 
from high levels of infant malnutrition, turned into a linguistic detective story, revealing 
layer after layer of cultural understanding. Kinship relations, social practices and above all 
witchcraft beliefs came into focus as Pool and his assistant searched for translations of 
Western bio-medical terms and sought to understand their indigenous meanings. Not only 
were indigenous terms loaded with cultural significance, far beyond any Western equivalent, 
but they also proved highly idiomatic, and their ‘discovery’ and explanation as dependent 
upon the dialogue with the anthropologists as upon any firmly fixed areas of cultural 
agreement. Wittgenstein (1953) developed the notion of a ‘language game’ to emphasise 
the construction of reality as language is lived out in speech, as opposed to seeing it as a 
given to be received and passed on passively. The fluidity, rather than arbitrariness, of signs 
and signifiers concerning health and disease, morality and human relations, is evident in 
Pool’s choice of narrative style. This fascinating study points not to the triumph of an 
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extreme post-modernist view of language and culture, in which all reality might be regarded 
as relative, contingent and therefore ultimately ephemeral,
5
 but to the complexity of 
language and its embeddedness in culture. It asserts the creativity of human beings, who 
simultaneously draw upon a reservoir of cultural understanding, while creatively 
transforming language and culture (including religious beliefs and practices) as they live out 
its performance.  
 
 
Experience 
If language and culture limit the extent to which we can be open, empathetic interpreters of 
another culture, what of experience? Anthropology claims a distinctive if not unique 
methodology, participant observation. The discipline of (social and cultural) anthropology 
can be defined as a comparative study of human life. Anthropologists are convinced that 
reliable data concerning human society can best be gathered by becoming part of that 
society. The ethnographer seeks to immerse him or herself in alternative cultural and belief 
systems, taking part in rituals, learning the language and etiquette of another culture or 
social group, gathering data on social forms and institutions and adopting as far as possible 
and appropriate the habitus or bodily techniques characteristic of the host society. What at 
first appears strange or incomprehensible gradually begins to seem normal and natural – 
enabling the ethnographer to reflect on his or her pre-existing suppositions and common 
sense notions – the process of making the familiar strange. The encounter between the 
culture of the ethnographer and fieldwork subjects, as well as a wider comparison between 
diverse cultures and societies, is a key component of the anthropological method, earning it 
the epithet ‘comparative sociology’. 
 
Fieldwork is often described as a rite of passage, following Arnold van Gennep’s (1960) 
three-fold classification of transition rituals into the phases of separation, transition and 
incorporation. The neophyte leaves the safety of the university library for the rigours of the 
field, becomes absorbed, to a greater or lesser extent, into alternative ways of thinking and 
seeing the world, before returning triumphantly with field notes, photos, videos and tape 
recordings, ready for the transformation of data into the text that will in turn provide the 
entry ticket into the profession of anthropologist. The key fact concerning the information 
which is then worked over and interpreted for an academic audience is that it represents a 
lived experience. The field notes have the power to evoke the sights, smells, sounds and 
above all emotions that accompanied the recording of genealogies, crop rotation or 
conversations.
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 Theories that might have seemed startlingly relevant and convincing in the 
comfort of the university seminar are measured against the ‘reality’ of lived experience in 
the field. One of anthropology’s key methodological strengths is this potential to put 
theories to the test in an empirical setting, not as an occasional experiment but as the very 
condition for their acceptance. Michael Jackson (1996:4) expresses the groundedness of 
anthropological theorising when he states that: ‘Fieldwork brings home to us the ontological 
priority of social existence, and fieldwork-based writing affirms that truth must not be seen 
an unmasking which eclipses the appearance of the thing unmasked, but as form of 
disclosure which does it justice’. The ethnographer is usually profoundly challenged and 
often changed by the encounter with the ‘other’, although may only come to terms with 
how much he or she has changed, and the significance of these transformations, on the 
return home, when faced with former ways of thinking and being. Studying the religion of 
others has a particular power to challenge conceptual frameworks, however partially we 
succeed in entering into alternative worlds.  
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Most anthropologists no longer regard ethnography as a neutral record of other societies (if 
indeed they ever did – former generations of anthropologists were usually far more nuanced 
in their understanding of the dialogical nature of field research than some proponents of a 
post-modern anthropology give them credit for). Ethnography is based on a dialectical 
relationship between the observer and the observed. When trying to understand witchcraft 
beliefs and practices in Cameroon I may never have shared the experiences of my 
informants, nor felt their fear in the face of a witchcraft attack or accusation. On the other 
hand I cannot conceive of morality or of the relationship between the mind and body in the 
same way as before. If an apparently healthy young man is brought into a mission hospital 
claiming that he will die because he has been bewitched, and subsequently dies, I do not 
necessarily conclude that a witch has eaten his life force in the spirit world, but I do wonder 
at the power the mind and emotions can exert over the body. If I claim to believe, as I do, in 
the power of prayer to positively affect the health and well-being of those I love, I cannot 
(logically) totally dismiss the possibility of a commensurate debilitating power. Jeanne 
Favret-Saada (1980), who studied witchcraft accusations in rural Normandy in the 1970s 
concluded that witchcraft existed even if witches did not. For those who believed 
themselves bewitched and who became caught up in the world of accusations, counter-
accusations and ‘unwitchers’, witchcraft was a real and potent facet of daily existence. 
Anthropological interpretations of witchcraft as a remedial institution or metaphor for social 
relations did not diminish the power of witchcraft as a powerful force in people’s lives. It 
became the lens through which the peasant farmers viewed the world and ordered and 
interpreted relationships with kin and neighbours. Among the Bangwa of Cameroon, as in 
much of sub-Saharan Africa, everyone is an actual or potential witch. Even without the 
actual malefice of one’s neighbours, the power exerted by a discourse of witchcraft, and 
belief that one is a victim, can be literally unbearable. 
 
Language, bodily experience, emotions and contiguity in time and space can all act as 
bridges between individuals and cultures, but cannot enable us to claim to ‘know the other’. 
I am more likely to empathise with the feelings of my own child than with those of a 
stranger. I may recognise grief, but still find it easier to interpret the signs of mourning of a 
widow in Britain who has lost her life time’s partner, than the behaviour of a Bangwa woman 
in Cameroon, who may have been the junior wife of a chief whose social life centred around 
her children and co-wives. But I can also be mistaken. I depend on powers of imagination 
and empathy, as well as my knowledge of the context and social relations of those involved. 
As in any relationship, the ability to interpret the cultural signals of those with whom one 
lives is a process, we may become more proficient but the other is never fixed, totally 
predictable or absorbed into oneself. Michael Jackson has emphasised the importance of 
personal experience in being able to at least reach out to and empathise with others. If we 
are not to imagine ourselves as isolated entities, we have to assume a level of common 
humanity – what Jackson refers to as the ‘paradox of human existence – that one can be in 
the world only if one feels that one’s own world is, in some significant sense, also the world’. 
He continues (1998:15):  
… it is irrelevant whether the psychic unity of humankind is proven scientifically or accepted on 
ideological grounds because it is existentially imperative. Human sameness everywhere 
consists in similar differences … Such a notion of the singular universal grounds the practical 
possibility of crossing cultural boundaries, and doing anthropological fieldwork. 
What we have experienced, consciously or unconsciously, verbally and non-verbally, 
becomes the raw material for interpretation of a culture, together with our observations and 
the interpretations members of a culture give us in turn of their own experiences.
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 The 
anthropologist aims to grasp a far more complex reality than that presented by an ostensibly 
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straightforward or objective interview transcript or the results of a questionnaire survey. As 
James Fernandez puts it (1986:164): 
The ethnography of a social situation requires, as we now well recognize in anthropology, that 
we go much beyond the given language information. Giving primacy to the imagination, I wish 
to refer to this ongoing interaction as the ‘argument of images’ that lie behind and accompany 
behavior. Some of these images have their source in language; many of them do not. 
While much could be said on the nature of experience and of experiences (as heightened 
semantic moments) and of their expression and codification, I will instead turn once again to 
the ‘dilemma’ of the anthropologist studying religion, and look at some of the ways in which 
new cultural experiences impact on the individual. 
 
 
Interpreting Experience 
When our view of the world is challenged we can react in a number of ways. First of all, new 
information can be absorbed into an expanded or modified cosmology on a temporary or 
more permanent basis. Secondly, former ways of thinking and being can be comprehensively 
rejected in favour of ‘going native’ - in reality, as when an ethnographer adopts the 
language, customs and social networks the people he or she studies, or in an imaginative 
reconstruction of a supposed reality (‘playing Indian’). A third possibility is to firmly reject 
novel ideas and experiences and to erect barriers around and reinforce a pre-existing 
mindset.
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 All three reactions are apparent in the published works of anthropologists of 
religion, and I will give brief examples of each, although the distinctions between these 
reactions are seldom as sharply drawn as I have suggested above. 
 
(1) Modifying a cosmology (temporarily or permanently) to fit new dimensions of knowledge 
and experience 
James Clifton
 
(1992) had spent a year studying Kansas Potawatomi ‘Dream Dance’ rites when 
he heard of an infamous Indian wizard, Swoops Down, and although warned off him, 
curiosity got the better of the day and Clifton arranged to meet him. After being kept waiting 
for much of the day the young anthropologist and old Indian finally met and for a moment 
held each other’s eyes:  
Suddenly this huge snarling Eagle drove out of the sun at me, sharp open beak thrusting at my 
face, talons slashing at my eyes! I was hit by a massive adrenaline rush. Heart pounding I 
leaped back, fell ass-over-teakettle on top of the milk box, hit the dirt hard (p. 42). 
Clifton’s first reaction was to take cover or find a weapon to protect himself from the eagle’s 
attack but,  
What eagle? Heart still thumping I looked up half fearfully, protecting my face with one arm. 
There was no eagle. That miserable sorcerer was standing there perfectly relaxed, arms at his 
side, the hint of a sneer on pursed lips, glancing at me contemptuously with a glint of satisfied 
malice in his eyes (ibid.).  
Reflecting on this incident later, Clifton could reason that the old man had heard that he had 
been stumbling around for weeks looking for a sorcerer, and that the performance was well 
planned. ‘When Clifton the Gullible arrived, he’d out silenced me, stalled until I was nervous, 
dehydrated, suggestible, half-broiled, and more than half-blinded by the sun. Then Swoops 
Down pounced on his prey’ (p. 43). Clifton’s final assessment of his experience was that the 
old Indian was ‘a man of impressive deeds but few words’ who had ‘delivered up a vivid, 
terrifying sampling of his repertoire’ (ibid.). While he did not conclude that Swoops Down 
had metamorphosed into an eagle, the message delivered to his senses at the moment of 
encounter, he was left in no doubt of the wizard’s power to alter perceptions of reality. 
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The ethnographic record is replete with similar accounts of anthropologists attempting to 
rationalise experiences post facto, experiences that at the time posed a profound challenge 
to their way of understanding the world and of interpreting experience. There are degrees of 
accommodation. Some experiences can be fitted into an existing conceptual framework by 
simply expanding the boundaries of what is understood as possible by science, psychology, 
or the religious faith of the ethnographer. When Jeanne Favret-Saada became drawn into 
the world of witches and ‘unwitchers’ in Normandy she realised that it was because she had 
been cast by her hosts in the role of an ‘unwitcher’, albeit a not very powerful one. When 
perceived as a dispassionate ethnographer asking scientific questions, the discourse of 
witchcraft had remained firmly closed to her, but as an active participant in this discourse – 
a role initiated by events and by the family with whom she lived, an alternative cosmology 
was gradually revealed. While Favret-Saada (1980, 1989) also sought training with an 
established ‘unwitcher’, and was convinced of the ‘reality’ of the phenomenon for the 
people among whom she lived, she remained faithful to her scientific training. When it came 
to interpreting and writing her material for an academic audience, witchcraft was described 
as a ‘remedial institution’ that helped individuals who inherited the family property to take 
control of it, despite the fact that this usually involved disinheriting siblings. 
 
(2) Going native 
In John Messenger’s (1992) delightful account of his acquaintance with an Irish leipreachan, 
known affectionately as Brendan, Messenger and his wife appear not only to have 
appropriated the ways of seeing of their hosts, but to have maintained this vision on their 
re-entry into American academic life. Messenger claims that although the locals spoke little 
of fairies, referring to them respectfully as the ‘gentry’ or ‘good people’, they never the less 
played an important role in people’s lives. In respect of the Messenger’s own encounter with 
a leipreachan John Messenger wrote, 
… during our stay on the island we came to feel the immaterial presence of this creature so 
intensely and to anticipate his pranks with such enthusiasm that we eventually came to view 
him as a third member of our family, well deserving an affectionate and suitable name (p. 199). 
Brendan’s favourite trick was opening bolted and shuttered doors and windows at night, 
although they hypothesised that he may also have been responsible for violin music 
emanating from beneath the eaves of an elderly neighbour’s house. On returning to the 
United States at the end of their period of fieldwork, the Messengers were delighted to find 
that Brendan had followed them across the Atlantic, adding to his repertoire by switching on 
lights, manipulating the heating thermostat, running baths, turning off the alarm clock in the 
night but thoughtfully waking one or other of its owners when it was due to go off, as well as 
developing a taste for Irish whisky. 
 
Messenger took to giving his comparative religion students a weekly update on Brendan’s 
doings, and mused that he might have won some converts to a belief in fairies by the ‘sheer 
enthusiasm and obvious honesty of my own convictions’ (p. 204), but found that his 
colleagues were far from convinced, commenting that (ibid.):  
Anthropologists are a tough-minded lot who espouse cultural relativism, naturalism, and the 
other ‘isms’ that humanists and theologians find so repugnant. The customary attitude of the 
fieldworker toward what his subjects interpret as supernatural events is one of extreme 
skepticism (sic) or active disbelief. There are some anthropologists, however, who at least 
maintain an open mind where these phenomena are concerned … Having been able to 
determine to our own satisfaction the naturalistic cause of these occurrences [supra-natural 
events in Nigeria as well as in Ireland], we have always been willing to consider the reality of 
the supernatural, but with something less than open minds. This tender-minded attitude is 
regarded as poison oak in the more scientific groves of academe. 
 10
 
The Messengers are not alone in choosing to modify or reject previous scientific 
assumptions as to how the world works. While the light-hearted tone of Messenger’s writing 
allows the possibility that he might be pulling one’s leg, despite assertions to the contrary, 
the same cannot be said of Paul Stoller (1989:227), who wrote of his experiences with 
Songhay sorcerers in Niger: 
The Songhay world challenged the basic premises of my scientific training. Living in Songhay 
forced me to confront the limitations of the Western philosophical tradition. My seventeen-
year association with Songhay reflects the slow evolution of my thought, a thought profoundly 
influenced by Songhay categories and Songhay wisdom. 
By seeking initiation as a sorcerer, Stoller not only gained ethnographic data on Songhay 
sorcery but, as has happened to other ethnographers, (although not invariably) came to 
believe both in his own occult powers and in his vulnerability to the malefice of others.
9
 He 
finally fled from Niger, when he believed that a sorcerer he had inadvertently angered many 
years before would use her occult powers to harm him (and his co-author, Cheryl Olkes). 
Like Favret-Saada, Stoller discovered that there is no neutral position from which to 
participate or observe the occult. By entering into that world he inevitably became 
positioned within it, and had to bear the consequences of acting like, and being considered 
by others, a sorcerer. 
 
(3) Reassertion of a Western scientific paradigm 
Despite critiques of science and of its suitability of a tool for ethnographic research,
10
 most 
ethnographers recognise that data can be of varying quality, of greater or lesser accuracy. 
Ethnographers differ in the extent of their aspirations to objectivity or commitment to 
reflexivity as part of their effort at honest description and interpretation. While so-called 
scientific and interpretative approaches to anthropology are often portrayed as opposed, 
the differences can be more of style and subject matter than substance. Good science and 
good interpretation both involve an awareness of context, including the subjective role of 
the ethnographer, and an ability to grasp the given’s of another culture, which is then 
expressed it in a way that others, usually readers of an ethnographic text, can grasp. One of 
the problems for anthropologists espousing strictly scientific methods and approaches is the 
exclusion of much of human experience from the purview of anthropology. A rather 
arbitrary line must be drawn around experiences that can be verified or falsified, which can 
contribute to scientific knowledge, and areas of life that are defined as metaphysical or 
ethical and therefore beyond the scope of (scientific) anthropological enquiry.
11
 While some 
of those who define themselves as scientific anthropologists are content to simply skirt 
around areas of knowledge and experience that are not amenable to western science, 
others are more strident in their dismissal of all metaphysical claims, turning science itself 
into a weapon to defend the individual from any threat to their view of the world. One 
representative of this so-called scientific approach is James Lett (1997), who attempts to 
demolish the claims, or as he would see it, pretensions, of interpretative and post-modern 
ethnographic writing, which he regards as a betrayal of anthropology as a science of society. 
Lett argues that the exclusion of religion from scientific scrutiny is both unwarranted and 
objectionable. According to Lett, ‘Considerations of disciplinary integrity, public welfare, and 
human dignity demand that religious claims be subjected to anthropological evaluation’ 
(1997:104). Lett defines science by its rationality, and religion by its irrationality, contending 
that ‘anthropologists have an intellectual and ethical obligation to investigate the truth or 
falsity of religious beliefs’ (p. 105). Having set the terms of the debate, with the fervour of a 
true believer, Lett summarises his argument by stating: 
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We know that no religious belief is true because we know that all religious beliefs are either 
nonfalsifiable or falsified. In the interests of scientific integrity, we have an obligation to 
declare that knowledge. Doing so, of course, would not preclude other anthropological 
analyses of religion, and I would not want to be understood as having suggested that we 
should abandon the study of the social, psychological, ecological, symbolic, aesthetic, and 
ethical functions and dimensions of religion … Nevertheless, the scientific study of religion will 
never be fully legitimate until scientists recognize and proclaim the truth about religion (p. 
116).  
 
Lett’s personal experiences, religious or otherwise, are not disclosed, but it is not hard to 
imagine that as for all scholars, our personal biography, culture and language provide the 
filter through which the world is perceived. While not dismissing all non-scientific studies of 
religion, Lett is also clear of his priorities and of the relative value of a ‘scientific’ as opposed 
to a social, symbolic, ethical or any other approach to religion. One of the key problems with 
Lett’s ‘scientific’ anthropology is that he has reached his universally applicable conclusions a 
priori, simply by the way he defined the terms of the debate. If religion is irrational belief, 
and therefore non-scientific, there seems little point expending time and energy proclaiming 
this point. To suggest that it is somehow a matter of public interest to prove this irrationality 
bespeaks a personal rather than purely scientific agenda. It certainly gets us no nearer to an 
understanding of what religion is and does, what it means and how it is performed and 
transmitted by those who practice it. Neither does it give interpretative space to the 
personal experiences described by the ethnographer and his or her informants as 
supernatural, religious or metaphysical.  
 
 
The Anthropologist’s Dilemma 
For most anthropologists of religion proving or disproving the logical truth of religion is not 
an issue, whatever their personal beliefs or experiences. Although seldom acknowledged 
directly, Husserl’s pupil, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is a more significant influence on 
anthropological theory and methodology than logical positivism. For Merleau-Ponty a 
phenomenological approach to religion, or to any other social phenomenon, does not just 
involve bracketing out the truth or falsity of a statement, but recognising that we can only 
perceive the world as embodied subject within it. The conscious mind or cogito is not a 
neutral observer, but a subject in dialogue with other subjects, or as Merleau-Ponty 
expressed it (1982:570):  
It is precisely my body which perceives the other’s body and finds there something like a 
miraculous prolongation of our own intentions … Henceforth, just as the parts of my body 
jointly form a system, the other’s body and mine are a single whole, the face and the reverse 
of sole phenomenon …
12
 
 
Ethnography consists of a dialectic between self and ‘other’. There are three movements, 
the encounter with the self, the ‘I’ who engages in dialogue, the encounter with the ‘other’ 
and finally the attempt to interpret the ‘other’, both to oneself and to a (usually) different 
‘other’. Belief and experience are not opposed categories but part of who we are and how 
we act in the world. I do not believe that scientific honesty – being open to correction, 
commitment to accurate representation and to the development of theories and methods 
that do justice to the data - is necessarily at odds with a clearly stated ethical, moral or 
metaphysical view of the world. Hans-Georg Gadamer, who helped shape the turn to a 
literary ‘post-modern’ analysis of society, also urged a rapprochement between what are 
essentially humanistic and scientific ways of understanding and interpreting the world. He 
wrote (1966:3-4), ‘Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-
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world, and the all-embracing form of the constitution of the world’ but went on to say, 
‘hence we always have in view the pronouncements of the sciences, which are fixed in 
nonverbal signs’. Gadamer aimed to ‘reconnect the objective world of technology, which the 
sciences place at our disposal and discretion, with those fundamental orders of being that 
are neither arbitrary nor manipulable by us, but rather simply demand our respect’. 
 
Gadamer borrowed the term ‘hermeneutics’ from Heidegger to refer to a method of 
judgement based on the relevance of the data to the reader: ‘What we reject has nothing to 
say to us – or we reject it because it has nothing to say to us’ (1996:4). This is close to 
Dilthey’s (1976:210) observation that the past only has meaning for us when we bring it into 
a relationship with the present.
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 Or, as Edward Bruner (1986:12) summarises it, ‘Cultural 
transmission is not simply a replication of an old original, a mechanical transfer of the 
cultural heritage from generation to generation … Culture is alive, context sensitive, and 
emergent’. It would seem then, that we cannot ignore the self, our own experience and our 
internal dialogue with our own culture and history, or with those of others, if we wish to 
interpret human society. 
 
Paul Ricoeur, despite being closely associated with the post-modern emphasis on textuality, 
tried to use the metaphor and methods of textual study to add depth to, rather than 
jettison, the scope of human action amenable to scientific enquiry. In an article entitled ‘The 
Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text’ written in 1971, he stated that 
(1991:151): 
My claim is that action itself, action as meaningful, may become an object of science, without 
losing its character of meaningfulness, through a kind of objectification similar to the fixation 
that occurs in writing. By this objectification, action is no longer a transaction to which the 
discourse of action would still belong. It constitutes a delineated pattern that has to be 
interpreted according to its inner connection. 
 
I have framed this article as a dilemma, or discourse between belief and experience. In 
practice this dichotomy can be interpreted as a tension between personal faith, ways of 
interpreting novel experiences, and a commitment to scientific objectivity. As the examples 
from Gadamer and Ricoeur indicate, what are broadly referred to as post-modern 
interpretations are not necessarily anti-science, but rather seek to plumb depths of human 
experience and the human spirit that scientific methods are unable to accommodate. 
Ricoeur makes the useful distinction for ethnographers between shared feelings and thought 
processes, which may be neither useful nor possible for an outsider, and the ability to 
understand and disclose an alternative world view (1994:167): 
As the model of text interpretation shows, understanding has nothing to do with an immediate 
grasping of foreign psychic life or with an emotional identification with a mental intention. 
Understanding is entirely mediated by the whole of explanatory procedures that preceded it 
and accompany it. The counterpart of this personal appropriation is not something that can be 
felt, it is the dynamic meaning released by the explanation…with reference to the text, that is, 
its power of disclosing the world. 
While it is not possible to do justice to Ricoeur’s argument for the suitability of textual 
analysis for social action here, it is worth noting that the hermeneutical methods espoused 
by Gadamer and Ricoeur among others, have had a considerable influence on a generation 
of social and cultural anthropologists. Clifford Geertz, often thought of as the father of 
modern interpretative anthropology, has taken over both the language of hermeneutics and 
the search for a meaningful disclosure of other worlds from these thinkers. He was not so 
much wary of scientific methodology as applied to anthropology, but aware of its limitations 
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when undertaking such a complex task as attempting to study human cultures and societies 
from the inside. Geertz coined the phrase ‘thick description’ to capture the quality of 
interpretation necessary if we are to make sense of our ethnographic data (1993:16): 
The claim to attention of an ethnographic account does not rest on its author’s ability to 
capture primitive facts in faraway places and carry them home like a mask or a carving, but on 
the degree to which he is able to clarity what goes on in such places, to reduce the puzzlement 
– what manner of men are these? – to which unfamiliar acts emerging out of unknown 
backgrounds naturally give rise. This raises some serious problems of verification, all right – or, 
if ‘verification’ is too strong a word for so soft a science (I myself, would prefer ‘appraisal’), of 
how you can tell a better account from a worse one. But that is precisely the virtue of it. If 
ethnography is thick description and ethnographers those who are doing the describing, then 
the determining question for any given example of it, whether a field journal squib or a 
Malinowski-sized monograph, is whether it sorts winks from twitches and real winks from 
mimicked ones. It is not against a body of uninterpreted data, radically thinned descriptions, 
that we must measure the cogency of our explications, but against the power of the scientific 
imagination to bring us into touch with the lives of strangers. It is not worth it, as Thoreau said, 
to go round the world to count the cats in Zanzibar. 
 
We are enmeshed in language and other aspects of culture, but can also transcend them. 
They precede us but as we speak and enact our culture they are performed in and through 
us. They can separate us from others but also have the power to unite us. As Merleau-Ponty 
(1974:17) said of language, ‘He who speaks enters into a system of relations which 
presupposes his presence and at the same time makes him open and vulnerable’. If 
anthropology and anthropologists have anything to contribute to the study of religion I 
would suggest that it is born of this vulnerability – a willingness to enter into new worlds and 
return to share the experience with others. While any particular form of belief is not a pre-
requisite to this form of vulnerability, the desire to communicate with, and experience the 
‘other’ is. Anthropological methodology offers the possibility of personal, embodied 
encounters with the ‘other’ – with living as well as written texts, and challenges the 
ethnographer to include embodied experience as part of the theoretical and analytical 
matrix of interpretation. This is not an appeal to a narcissistic fixation on the self or a claim 
that good ethnography differs little from an imaginary or largely fictitious but lively and 
compelling account of a culture or society. A willingness to use the self as a research tool 
and an acknowledgement of the role and complexity of the multiple dialogues involved in 
ethnographic work and in anthropological interpretations does, however, constitute a 
valuable resource for an honest, scientific interpretation of religion, culture and social life. 
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NOTES  
1.  I am indebted to Veronica Strang for drawing my attention to this debate. This paper was 
first delivered at the Alister Hardy Society Members Day in Oxford, November 2000. It is 
available on cassette from the Alister Hardy Society for the Study of Spiritual Experience. A 
revised version of the paper was delivered to the Anthropology research seminar in the 
University of Wales Lampeter in Lent Term 2001. I am grateful to colleagues and students 
for their perceptive and constructive comments. 
2. In practice the term 'indigenous' is seldom clearly defined, although there is an unstated 
continuum from those peoples' with the simplest technologies (such as Khoisan peoples in 
South Africa or Malay Pygmies) to peasant cultures or countries simply further away from 
Europe, to those on our borders or in our midst who are not part of the dominant group 
(such as Gypsies, or perhaps hill farmers with quaint customs). Although anthropologists are 
as likely to study the workings of the European Commission, Japanese business culture or drug 
addicts in European cities as people in 'simpler societies' (finding politically correct terms is 
always sensitive), the latter are unlikely to find their views represented as 'indigenous 
knowledge'.  
3. Published as The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity: Spreading the Gospel of 
Prosperity. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
4. The biannual conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists held in 
Krakow, Poland in July 2000. 
5. The unreality, or 'hyperreality' of existence is the logical conclusion to which the 
postmodernist scholar Jacques Baudrillard (1983, 1994) has taken the view that nothing 
objective can be salvaged beyond the multiple readings of a text. This extreme 
deconstruction of 'reality' potentially undermines any attempt to describe and interpret the 
'other', and has led many anthropologists to reaffirm the validity and actuality of culture 
and experience as something both observable and at the same time dynamic and dialogical 
(cf. Brian Morris (2000:13): '… like social phenomena, cultural forms, though actual entities, 
must not be conceived as 'thing like' … But rather must be viewed as a process. Cultural 
representations thus come into being; they are relatively enduring (have duration), they 
have a certain coherence (unity); they have causal efficacy; they are open systems with 
conditions of existence (human social life); and they perish – just like people and elephants 
and everything else in the world'. 
6. Cf. Merleau-Ponty (1974:26), 'It always appears to us that the operations of experience 
codified in our language follow the very articulations of being, because it is through them 
that we relate to being.' 
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7. See Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Writings (1976). Dilthey's writings on ritual and performance, 
the relationship between experience and its interpretation and between the cognitive and 
somatic elements of experience have influenced many anthropologists of the so-called 
'interpretative' (or neo-Kantian) school. 
8. Cf. Mary Douglas' (1996:38ff) discussion of public categories and the ways in which societies 
deal with the anomalies. 
9. Eric de Rosny (1985), a Jesuit priest working in Douala, Cameroon, succeeded in training as 
an nganga (sometimes translated as 'native doctor' or in older texts, 'witch doctor') without 
sacrificing either his Christian faith and ethics or his respect for the ngangas who befriended 
and guided him. He was convinced of the reality of their powers, but found it possible to 
accommodate this perception into a Roman Catholic view of the world. 
10. See for instance many of the contributions to James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.) 
(1986) and Peter Pels and Lorraine Nencel (eds.) (1991). 
11. The position taken by Lawrence Kuznar (1997). 
12. Merleau-Ponty, cited in Spiegleberg (1982:570). 
13. Quoted in Turner (1986:36) 
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